Volume 20
Issue 2 Spring 1990
Spring 1990

Wills and Trusts
Matthew T. Byers

Recommended Citation
Matthew T. Byers, Wills and Trusts, 20 N.M. L. Rev. 439 (1990).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmlr/vol20/iss2/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The University of New Mexico School of Law. For more
information, please visit the New Mexico Law Review website: www.lawschool.unm.edu/nmlr

WILLS AND TRUSTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

This article will survey important cases in wills and trusts law reported
in the Bar Bulletin between January 1, 1988, and August 1, 1989. The
article includes nine sections covering probate procedure, undue influence,
gifts, construction of wills, evidence, damages against estates, distribution
of estates, personal representative fees, and trusts. Although the New
Mexico appellate courts have decided a wide variety of issues during the
survey period, it is a United States Supreme Court opinion which appears
to have the greatest effect upon New Mexico law. This decision significantly affects probate procedure in New Mexico and the constitutionality
of New Mexico's non-claim statute.'
II.

PROBATE PROCEDURE

A.

New Mexico's Non-Claim Statute
In Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope,2 the United
States Supreme Court held that Oklahoma's non-claim statute, which
allowed personal representatives to give notice to creditors by publication,
violated the due process clause.' The notice provisions of Oklahoma's
non-claim statute were very similar to the comparable provisions of New
4
Mexico's non-claim statute.

1.
2.
3.
4.

See infra notes 2-40 and accompanying text.
485 U.S. 478 (1988).
Id. at 491.
At the time of the opinion, Oklahoma's non-claim statute stated, in pertinent part, that:
Every personal representative must, immediately after his appointment, give notice
to the creditors of the deceased .. . requiring all persons having claims against
said deceased to present the same . . . to such personal representative, at the place
of residence or business ... within two (2) months from the date of the first
publication of said notice; such notice must be published in some newspaper printed
in said county for two (2) consecutive weeks....
OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 331 (1981). If a claim based upon contract was not presented within the
time limit, the claim was barred, with some exceptions. Id. at § 333.
New Mexico's non-claim statute comprises §§ 45-3-803, 45-3-804, and 45-3-806 of the Probate
Code. Section 45-3-803 states:
A. All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the death of the
decedent, including claims . .. founded on ... tort or other legal basis ... are
barred against the estate, the personal representative and the heirs and devisees of
the decedent, unless presented as follows:
1. within two months after the date of first publication of notice to creditors
if notice is given in compliance with [N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-3-801 (Repl. Pamp.
1989) ....
B. All claims against a decedent's estate which arise at or after the death of a
decedent ... founded on ... tort or other legal basis, are barred against the
estate, the personal representative and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless
presented as follows:

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

In Tulsa, the decedent spent approximately one-half year in a hospital
before he died.' After he died, his wife was appointed executrix of the
estate. 6 In accordance with Oklahoma law, the court ordered her to
"immediately give notice to creditors." 7 The wife gave notice by publishing
the notice in a legal newspaper for two consecutive weeks as required
by Oklahoma's non-claim statute.' Tulsa Professional Collection Services
("Claimant") was the assignee of the hospital's right to payment for
taking care of the decedent in his last six months. 9 The Claimant did
not file a claim in response to the wife's notice.' 0 Instead, it applied for
an Order Compelling Payment of Expenses of Last Illness as allowed
by statute. 1' After losing its argument that the Last Illness statute made
a claim under the non-claim statute unnecessary, the claimant argued on
rehearing that the non-claim statute violated the due process clause of
the United States Constitution.' 2 The Oklahoma Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court held that claimants in probate proceedings are not4 entitled
to actual notice.' 3 The United States Supreme Court reversed.'
The Supreme Court began by noting that the Oklahoma Supreme
Court's decision conflicted with the Nevada Supreme Court's decision in
ContinentalInsurance Co. v. Moseley.' In Continental, the United States
Supreme Court vacated and remanded an earlier Nevada Supreme Court
decision which held that a claimant had no right to actual notice under
the Nevada non-claim statute. 16 The Court remanded so that the Nevada
court could reconsider its decision in light of the Court's decision in

2. any other claim, within four months after it arises.
C. Nothing in this section affects or prevents:
2. to the limits of the insurance protection only, any proceeding to establish
liability of the decedent or the personal representative for which he is protected
by liability insurance.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-3-803 (Repl. Pamp. 1989). The notice provision is contained in § 45-3-801.
It states:
Unless notice has already been given under this section, a personal representative,
within a reasonable time after his appointment, shall publish a notice once a week
for two successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the county
announcing his appointment and address; the name of the decedent; and notifying
creditors of the estate to present their claims within two months after the date of
the first publication of the notice or be forever barred.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-3-801 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
5. Tulsa, 485 U.S. at 482.
6. Id.
7. Id. (quoting Record 14).
8. Id. at 482; see supra note 4.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. OKLA. STAT., tit. 58, § 594 (1981) states that personal representatives "must pay ...
the expenses of the last sickness" as soon as the representative has enough funds to do so.
12. Tulsa, 485 U.S. at 482-83.
13. Id. at 483.
14. Id. at 484.
15. 100 Nev. 337, 683 P.2d 20 (1984).
16. Continental Ins. Co. v. Moseley, 463 U.S. 1202 (1983), vacating and remanding Continental
Ins. Co. v. Moseley, 98 Nev. 476, 653 P.2d 158 (1982).
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Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams.17 On remand, the Nevada court
held that, in light of Mennonite, a personal representative who has actual
knowledge of a claimant cannot rely upon publication notice but must
give actual notice to the claimant."
The Supreme Court then reviewed its opinions in Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 19 and Mennonite Board of Missions v.
Adams.20 These cases held that actual notice is required when a state
deprives persons of a life, liberty, or property interest. 2' Finding those
analyses applicable in the Tulsa case, the Court held that the claimant's
claim was a property interest. 22 Then, the Court had to decide whether
the non-claim statute was state action which would give rise to due
process or whether it was a self-executing statute of limitations. 23 The

17. Continental Ins. Co. v. Moseley, 463 U.S. at 1202 (citing Mennonite Bd. of Missions v.
Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983)).
18. Continental, 100 Nev. at 338, 683 P.2d at 21. After Continental, three courts disagreed with
the Nevada Supreme Court. See Estate of Madden, 241 Kan. 414, 736 P.2d 940 (1987); Gibbs v.
Estate of Dolan, 146 I1. App. 3d 203, 100 Il1. Dec. 61, 496 N.E.2d 1126 (1986). See also Estate
of Busch v. Ferrell-Duncan Clinic, 700 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. 1985) (en banc) (Continental does not mean
that the United States Supreme Court will rule the same way). But see Palazzi v. Estate of Gardner,
32 Ohio St. 3d 169, 512 N.E.2d 971 (1987) (similar non-claim statute called into doubt, but claimant
lacked standing to challenge constitutionality of the notice provisions because he did not file claim
within the specified time after receiving actual notice).
19. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
20. 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
21. Tulsa, 485 U.S. at 484-85. Mullane interpreted the notice requirements under New York's
common trust fund statutes which required that notice of account settlements be published for four
consecutive weeks in a newspaper approved by the Surrogate Court. 339 U.S. at 309-10. The Court
held that a deprivation of property requires that the person deprived be given adequate notice of
the pending deprivation and an opportunity for a hearing. Id. at 313. The notice must be "reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Id. at 314. The Court held that while
notice by publication is sufficient when the interested parties are missing or unknown, "[where
the names and post office addresses of those affected by a proceeding are at hand, the reasons
disappear for resort to means less likely than the malls to apprise them of its pendency." Id. at
317-18. Notice to the latter kinds of beneficiaries was inadequate "not because in fact it fails to
reach everyone, but because under the circumstances it is not reasonably calculated to reach those
who could easily be informed by other means at hand." Id. at 319.
Mennonite relied on Mullane when it considered whether Indiana's tax sale notice was sufficient
to meet due process requirements. 462 U.S. at 795, 798. Under the Indiana statutes, counties could
sell property at tax sales after giving notice of the sale by publication. Id. at 793. After finding
that a mortgagee of the property has a substantial property interest affected by the tax sale, the
Court held that "unless the mortgagee is not reasonably identifiable, constructive notice alone does
not satisfy the mandate of Mullane." Id. at 798. Therefore, "[n]otice by mail or other means as
certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will
adversely affect the liberty or property interests of any party ... if its name and address are
reasonably ascertainable." Id. at 800. The Court assumed that the mortgagee's address, which was
not included on the mortgage filed in the county clerk's office, "could have been ascertained by
reasonably diligent efforts." Id. at 798 n.4.
22. Tulsa, 485 U.S. at 485.
23. Id. at 486. The claimant relied on Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1978), in claiming that
the non-claim statute was a self-executing statute. Tulsa, 485 U.S. at 486. A self-executing statute
of limitations is not considered to be sufficient state action to give rise to due process requirements.
Id. In Texaco, the Court upheld an Indiana lapse statute which extinguished mineral rights if those
rights were not used in 20 years. 454 U.S. at 518. Under the statute, no notice was required,
although it was permitted before the lapse period ran. Id. at 520. After assuming that the appellants
in Texaco had knowledge of the statute, the Court held that they had no constitutional right to
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Court decided that the non-claim statute was not self-executing because
a self-executing statute requires that the state have "no role to play
beyond enactment of the limitations period. ' 24 The Court held that the
Oklahoma non-claim statute involved "significant" state action because
it was triggered during the probate proceedings and only after a court
appointed a personal representative. 2 The Court also noted that the nonclaim statute started to run only after copies of the notice and an affidavit
of publication were filed. 26 The Court then held that if
the legal proceedings themselves trigger the time bar, even if those
proceedings do not necessarily resolve the claim on its merits, the
time bar lacks the self-executing feature that [Texaco v. Short2 7]
indicated was necessary to remove any due process problem. Rather,
in such circumstances, due process is directly implicated and actual
notice generally is required.2
Immediately after stating its holding, the Court began delineating the
holding's limits. The Court did not consider whether a non-claim statute
that runs from the date of the decedent's death-but runs for a longer
period of time than Oklahoma's existing non-claim statue-would violate
due process. 29 The Court also noted that neither the notice nor the search
for creditors must be burdensome. 0 "Nor is everyone who may conceivably have a claim properly considered a creditor entitled to actual
notice. Here, as in Mullane, it is reasonable to dispense with actual notice
to those with mere 'conjectural' claims." 3 Because the record did not
indicate whether the claimant was known or reasonably ascertainable to
the wife, the Court remanded the case to the Oklahoma state courts "to
determine whether 'reasonably diligent efforts' would have identified [the
claimant] and uncovered its claim. If [the claimant's] identity was known
or 'reasonably ascertainable,' then termination of [the claimant's] claim
'3 2
without actual notice [by mail or other means] violated due process.
The notice provisions of New Mexico's non-claim statute are, in many
respects, similar to the notice provisions of the Oklahoma statute which
were stricken in Tulsa.33 Most importantly, New Mexico's non-claim

be notified that their mineral rights would expire. Id. at 533. The Court stated that "[i]n
answering
this question, it is essential to recognize the difference between the self-executing feature of the
statute and a subsequent judicial determination that a particular lapse did in fact occur." Id. The
Court emphasized that "no mineral estate that has been protected by any of the means set forth
in the statute may be lost through lack of notice." Id. at 534. Rather, the interest is lost by the
claimant's inaction with no action by the state. Id. at 533-34. The Court also noted that the lack
of notice before the lapse "has no greater force than a claim that a self-executing statute of
limitations is unconstitutional." Id. at 536.
24. Tulsa, 485 U.S. at 486-87.
25. Id. at 487.
26. Id.
27. See supra note 23.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Tulsa, 485 U.S. at 487.
Id. at 488.
Id. at 489-90.
Id. at 490.
Id. at 491 (citations omitted).
See supra note 4.
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statute currently provides for notice by publication.3 4 Therefore, New
Mexico's non-claim statute, like Oklahoma's former non-claim statute,
may violate due process should a reasonably ascertainable claimant be
barred from asserting that claim based upon publication of the notice.
The Oklahoma legislature has since re-written its statute to provide for
notice by mail."
New Mexico's Probate Code is designed to close and distribute estates
quickly, efficiently, and in a manner that guards the interests of estate
beneficiaries and creditors.16 It provides two ways to accomplish this
goal, the short method3 7 and the long method. 8 The Oklahoma statute
is what the Supreme Court called a short statute of limitations.3 9 The
short method is the only limitation on presenting claims in Oklahoma.
New Mexico's non-claim statute is similar to Oklahoma's non-claim statute
in that it bars claims under the short method if the claims are not
presented within two months after publication. Unlike Oklahoma, New
Mexico also has the long method. Under section 45-3-803(A)(2), claims
against the estate are barred "within three years after the decedent's
death, if notice to creditors has not been published." This longer method
is the kind of statute that the Court expressly stated it did not rule
uponA0 However, the analysis in Tulsa suggests that a statute using the
no
long method would be self-executing because the probate court takes
4
action in bringing about the running of the statute of limitations .

34. See Letter from John P. Burton to Michie Company (October 30, 1989) (stating that the
New Mexico statute is partially unconstitutional). See also supra note 4.
35. Oklahoma's statute now reads in part, "The notice to creditors shall be given by publication
in some newspaper in the county in which the probate is filed once each week for two (2) consecutive
weeks, and by mall to all known creditors of the decedent at their respective last-known available
addresses, in accordance with Section 6 [OKLA. STAT., tit. 58, § 331.2 (1988)] of this act." OKLA.
STAT., tit.

58, § 331 (1988).

The legislature also added a section on. identifying creditors which reads:
A. As used in this act, "known creditors," and related or similar references shall
mean those creditors of the decedent actually known to the personal representative
or reasonably ascertainable by the personal representative as of the date notice to
creditors is filed. "Reasonably ascertainable creditors" shall be those whose identities,
last-known addresses and claims can be determined by reasonably diligent efforts
of the personal representative. If reasonable under the circumstances, such efforts
shall include the personal representative's conducting a search after the decedent's
death and prior to the filing of the notice to creditors, of the personal effects of
the decedent.
OKLA. STAT., tit. 58, § 331.1(A). Section 331.1 also requires the personal representative to file an
affidavit stating that he or she made reasonably diligent efforts to find the decedent's creditors.
Id. at § 331.1(B). Section 331.2 requires that the mailed notice be mailed within 10 days of filing
the notice. Id. at § 331.2. The notice sent must be an endorsed copy of the notice filed with the
court. Id. Also, notice is not required for any creditor who was unknown on the date of filing
the notice, even if the personal representative identifies the creditor after the notice was filed. Id.
Personal service is equivalent to mailing. Id. After the mailing is completed, the personal representative
must file an affidavit of mailing and of publication. Id. at § 332.
36. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-1-102 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
37. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-3-803(A)(1) (Repl. Pamp. 1989). See also supra note 4.
38. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-3-803(A)(2) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
39. Tulsa, 485 U.S. at 480.
40. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
41. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
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The short method meets the speed portion of the probate code's
objectives, but may do so at the expense of protecting creditors. The
long method meets the fairness requirement, but at the expense of speed.
The Court appears to balance these interests by allowing a speedy method
which must meet more demanding notice requirements. This balance
harmonizes with the Mullane decision in that it protects creditors from
deprivation of their property interests while disposing of the property in
as quick a way as possible. It appears that the Court has decided that
if a personal representative uses the short statute to accomplish the
objective that estates should be closed as quickly as possible, he must
do so in a way that imposes the least burden on creditors. If the personal
representative does not use the faster method, under New Mexico's nonclaim statute, the statute of limitations may be self-executing under Tulsa,
and therefore may meet due process requirements without giving actual
notice to creditors, unlike the short statute of limitations.
The Tulsa opinion appears to affect all probate matters, including the
matters discussed in this survey. One decision which appears to be particularly affected is the unpublished decision in Armenta v. Aragon.4 2 In
Armenta, the plaintiff was the decedents' nephew. 43 He claimed that the
decedents promised to leave him one-half of their estate in their will."
In their original wills, the decedents made mutual wills, naming the
plaintiff and defendant as the residual beneficiaries if the decedents did
not survive each other. 45 The husband, Tomas, died, leaving his estate
to his wife.4 His will was not probated and the wife received his estate
by operation of law. 47 The wife then made a new will naming the defendant
as the sole beneficiary and personal representative. 48 In this will, the wife
stated that "after the death of Tomas, she transferred certain funds to
plaintiff, and thus made no provision for him in her will." 49 After the
wife died, her will was admitted to probate and the defendant was
appointed personal representative. 10 The defendant published notice, 5 and
the plaintiff properly filed a claim with the appropriate court within the
statutory period under section 45-3-804. The plaintiff, however, did not
give personal notice to the defendant .12
While the probate case was pending, the plaintiff also filed a civil
action for declaratory judgment and constructive trust.5 In the civil case,
the plaintiff tried to have a personal representative appointed for Tomas'

42. Nos. 17,399 and 17,650 (N.M. Sup. Ct. November 21, 1988), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W.
3752 (1989) (No. 88-1558, 1988 Term).
43. Id., slip op. at p.2.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. The notice was in accordance with N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-3-801 (1978).
52. Id.at 2-3.
53. Id. at 3.
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estate, but his request was denied because he had not filed an application
to probate the estate.14 The defendant then moved to dismiss the civil
action because a personal representative for the husband's estate was an
indispensable party." The court allowed the plaintiff to amend his civil
action to include the husband's estate within fifteen days after a personal
representative was appointed.16 However, when the plaintiff tried to probate the husband's estate, the petition was denied as untimely under
section 45-3-108(A). 5 The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's civil action
because there was no personal representative for the husband's estate
and because his claim on the wife's estate should have been in the probate
proceeding58
The defendant did not take any action on the plaintiff's filed claim
until she personally learned about it-three years and four months after
it had been filed.5 9 She then filed a notice of disallowance and a motion
to strike the claim, stating that the claim was barred because it was not
properly served.6 The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings, stating that the defendant did not timely disallow
6
the claim which had been properly filed under section 45-3-804(A). 1
The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed both of the trial court's
decisions. It upheld the civil action because the plaintiff's actions were
not taken within the three-year statute of limitations. 62 Because the plaintiff's civil claim was based upon a contract, the husband's personal
representative was an indispensable party. 63 Because no personal representative could be appointed after the three-year period to probate the
estate had passed, the indispensable party could not be brought into the
civil action and the civil action had to be dismissed. 6' The court also
noted that the civil action would have failed because the agreement was-

54. Id.
55. Id. at 3-4. The court found that the husband's personal representative was an indispensable
party in the civil action because the plaintiff claimed that the husband was bound by the agreement.
The probate estate did not involve the husband. Id. at 7-8.
56. Id. at 4.
57. Id. Section 45-3-108(A) stated that persons cannot bring a probate proceeding unless it is
brought within three years of the decedent's death. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-3-108(A) (1978). The
husband died in 1981 and the plaintiff made his petition in 1987. Armenta, Nos. 17,399 and 17,650,
slip op. at 2-4.
58. Id. at 4.
59. Id. The claim was filed on April 5, 1983; the defendant did not learn of the claim until
October 8, 1986. Id.
60. Id. The defendant stated that the claim was time-barred under §§ 45-3-803 and 45-3-804.
See supra note 4. Section 804 states that a claimant may submit a claim by mailing it to the
personal representative or by filing the claim with the appropriate court. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 453-804 (1978).
61. Armenta, Nos. 17,399 and 17,650, slip op. at 4. A personal representative must mail a
notice of action to a claimant within 60 days of receiving the claim or within 60 days of the filing
of the claim. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-3-804 (1978). Failure to mail the notice of action is deemed
to be an allowance of the claim. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-3-806(A) (1978).
62. Armenta, Nos. 17,399 and 17,650, slip op. at 5.
63. Id.
64. Id. (quoting C. de Baca v. Baca, 73 N.M. 387, 394, 388 P.2d 392, 397 (1964) (quoting
American Trust and Savings Bank of Albuquerque v. Scobee, 29 N.M. 436, 453, 224 P.2d 788,
790 (1924))).
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not in writing, and "the 5mere making of a will" was not enough evidence
6
of the alleged contract.
Affirming the trial court's decision in the probate action, the supreme
court decided that the dismissal of the civil claim was not res judicata,
despite the fact that some of the property in the probate estate was the
same as that in the civil claim." The court then stated that the true
issue in the probate action was whether the section 45-3-804(A) notice
requirement is reasonable considering that the personal representative does

not receive personal notice. 67 The court noted that the personal representative begins the process by publishing the notice. 68 If the creditor
does not make a timely claim in accordance with the statute, the claim
is barred. 69 The court then found that "[b]ecause the personal representative initiates this process, it does not seem unreasonable to make it
incumbent upon the personal representative to follow up and check the
court file after the last day for presentation of claims has elapsed.' '70
The court's decision in Armenta appears to make sense in pre-Tulsa
cases. The court seems to view the matter as one of quid pro quo. If
the personal representative gets the benefit of the constructive notice
provisions of section 45-3-803 to deny claims, it should be barred by the
constructive notice provisions under section 45-3-806. However, it is
questionable whether the decision is valid after Tulsa. It appears that
the Tulsa opinion has taken away the quid of constructive notice upon
creditors. Therefore, it appears that the opinion would also take away
the quo of constructive notice upon personal representatives.
Yet, if Tulsa is inconsistent with Armenta, it becomes difficult to
explain why the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. It could
simply be that the United States Supreme Court rarely takes cases on
interlocutory appeal, as was the case in Armenta. The cases can also be
distinguished. Unlike the creditor in Tulsa, the personal representative
in Armenta had a fiduciary duty to examine the claims properly filed
with the court in accordance with section 45-3-804(A). Therefore, she
had a better chance to be notified, making this notice "reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of
the pendency of the action." 7' However, Mennonite required that "actual
notice [be] a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which
will adversely affect the liberty or property interests of any party ...
if its name and address are reasonably ascertainable. 7 2 Regardless of

65. Id. at 6 (citing In re Estate of Vincioni, 102 N.M. 576, 582, 698 P.2d 446, 452 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 102 N.M. 613, 698 P.2d 886 (1985)).
66. Id. at 7-8.
67. Id. at 8.
68. Id.
69. Id. (citing Corlett v. Smith, 106 N.M. 207, 210, 740 P.2d 1191, 1194 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 106 N.M. 174, 740 P.2d 1158 (1987)). For a discussion of Corlett v. Smith, see infra notes
90-104 and accompanying text.
70. Id. at 8.
71. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
72. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983).
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the fact that certiorari was denied, or the reasons for that denial, Tulsa
should warn attorneys that constructive notice under the statute may be
considered constitutionally impermissible.
Another case in which the supreme court discussed New Mexico's nonclaim statute was In re Estate of Mayfield." In Mayfield, the claimant74
made a timely claim against the estate for work and services performed.
The estate disallowed the claim, sending interrogatories and a request
for production of documents along with the disallowance. 7 The estate
then asked the district court for a trial setting, an order compelling
answers to the interrogatories, and a response to the request for production. 76 The parties completed discovery without the aid of the court.77
Nine days after the claimant should have asserted his claim by petitioning
for an allowance in the probate proceeding or by filing a separate
complaint against the personal representatives, 78 the court set a hearing
on the merits at the estate's request. 79 The claimant neither petitioned
for an allowance nor commenced a separate action.80 On the day of the
hearing on the merits, the estate moved to dismiss the claim because the
claimant failed to comply with the non-claim statute.8 The estate claimed
that the district court had no jurisdiction over the matter because the
claimant failed to give proper notice.8 2 The claimant responded that the
estate's conduct of seeking recovery and requesting a trial on the merits
"constituted substantial compliance with Section 45-3-806(A)," and "that
the estate manifested an intent to waive the claimant's filing of a petition
for allowance."18 3 The trial court held for the claimant on the procedural
point and then awarded him $34,000.84
On appeal, the supreme court reversed.85 The court held that neither
personal representatives nor heirs may waive the requirements of the nonclaim statute.8 6 The court held that although strict compliance is not
necessary under section 45-3-806(A), "the purpose of Section 45-3-806(A)
[which is to make an efficient system for settling estates] must be satisfied." '8 7 The court held that "[ulnilateral actions on the part of the

73. 108 N.M. 246, 771 P.2d 179 (1989).
74. Id. at 247, 771 P.2d at 180.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Under the non-claim statute, the claimant had to file his proceedings within 60 days of the
date the notice of disallowance was mailed. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-3-806(A) (1978).
79. Mayfield, 108 N.M. at 247, 771 P.2d at 180.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 247-48, 771 P.2d at 180-81.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 248, 771 P.2d at 181.
84. Id.at 247, 771 P.2d at 180.
85. Id.
86. Id. (citing In re Estate of Tarlton, 84 N.M. 95, 97-98, 500 P.2d 180, 182-183 (1972); In re
Landers' Estate, 34 N.M. 431, 238 P.2d 49 (1929)).
87. Id. at 249, 771 P.2d at 182 (citing In re Baeza's Estate, 41 N.M. 708, 73 P.2d 1351 (1937);
Mathieson v. Hubler, 92 N.M. 381, 588 P.2d 1056 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 353, 588
P.2d 554 (1978)).
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estate in preparation for defending against the claim or assuring its timely
resolution cannot constitute substantial compliance."" 8 The court appeared
to put the burden of the substantial compliance requirement solely on
the defendant.8 9
B. New Mexico's Insurance Exception
In Corlett v. Smith, 9° a husband's estate sued the wife's estate for
wrongful death after the wife committed suicide and inadvertently killed
the husband and their grandson. 9' The defendant moved to dismiss the
case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, stating that the plaintiff did
not comply with the notice provisions required to bring the claim. 92 In
Corlett I, the court of appeals held that the husband's estate had the
burden of showing that the claim was timely filed. 93 If the husband's
estate did not establish that the claim was timely filed, the trial court
had no jurisdiction to hear the claim unless the claim fit within the
insurance exception of section 45-3-803(C)(2). 94 The Corlett I court remanded the matter to the trial court to determine whether the husband's
estate's claim was based upon the wife's liability insurance, and, if so,
whether that claim came within the insurance exception. 95 If either question
96
was answered in the negative, the husband's claim would be denied.
After the trial court found that the husband's estate's claim fell under
the insurance exception, the wife's estate appealed. 97 The court of appeals
affirmed. 98 The court first held that "claims that will be paid by insurance
are not considered to be claims against the estate," noting that the
proceeds were not available to estate creditors and do not affect estate
beneficiaries so as to interfere with "an orderly and exact administration
of the estate." 99 Therefore, the husband's estate could file a claim for

88. Id. at 249, 771 P.2d at 182.
89. Id.
90. 106 N.M. 207, 740 P.2d 1191 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 106 N.M. 174, 740 P.2d 1158 (1987)
(Corlett 1) and 107 N.M. 707, 763 P.2d 1172 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 610, 762 P.2d
897 (1988) (Corlett I). Although the court consolidated both appeals, stating that "[i]n substance,
there is only one appeal," reference will be made to the two decisions as if there were two appeals
for clarity. For an earlier discussion of Corlett I, see Eisenberg, Estates and Trusts, 19 N.M.L.
Rev. 669, 675-77 (1989).
91. Corlett 1, 106 N.M. at 208, 740 P.2d at 1192. The wife left the car running in the garage
and lay down by the exhaust pipe. She inadvertently left the garage door open so that the carbon
monoxide from the car entered the house where the husband and grandson were sleeping. Id.
92. Id. at 209, 740 P.2d at 1193. The defendant asserted that the plaintiff did not timely present
his claim to the wife's estate under the non-claim statute. Id. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-3-803
(1978). For the provisions of § 45-3-803, see supra note 4.
93. 106 N.M. at 209, 740 P.2d at 1193.
94. Id. at 210, 740 P.2d at 1194 (citing In re Estate of Daigle, 634 P.2d 71, 76 (Colo. 1981)
(en banc). For the provisions of § 45-3-803(C)(2), see supra note 4. The court did not address the
Tulsa issue because Tulsa had not been decided at the time. See supra notes 2-40 and accompanying
text. It is unclear whether the personal representative knew or had reason to know of the claim.
95. 106 N.M. at 211, 740 P.2d at 1195.
96. Id.
97. Corlett II, 107 N.M. at 709, 763 P.2d at 1174.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 709-10, 763 P.2d at 1174-75 (citing and quoting Sommermeyer v. Price, 198 Colo.
548, 552, 603 P.2d 135, 138 (1979) (en banc)).
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relief up to the limits of the insurance policy if the husband's estate
"ultimately might collect from the insurance company." ' 0 Because sections 45-3-803(A) and (B) provide for "any proceeding to establish liability
01°
of the decedent . . . for which he is protected by liability insurance,'
the court stated that a possibility of recovery allows the husband's estate
to make the claim under the insurance exception. 0 2 "We hold that, for
purposes of the Probate Code, 'protection' should be considered the
03
potential right to payment of a claim against the insurance company.'
Therefore, the claimant does not have to prove that the claim would be
covered; it simply must show that coverage is possible under the decedent's
liability policy. 1°4
Notice of Tax Sales
In Fulton v. Cornelius,05 the court of appeals also held that the due
process clauses of the United States' ° and New Mexico'07 constitutions
require the New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department's Property
Tax Division (the "Division") to give an estate's personal representative
reasonable notice of a tax sale where a representative has been appointed
and when the fact of the decedent's death and the representative's appointment is "reasonably ascertainable."'108 The court held that the Division must make 'reasonably diligent efforts' to discover the names
and addresses of those whose interest in the property can reasonably be
ascertained prior to conducting a tax sale."' 1 9 Whether there has been
reasonable diligence should be determined by the facts of each case. t°
In Fulton, the court held that the Division was not reasonably diligent
because it had notice of the personal representative's appointment after
(1) the personal representative filed proof of his appointment with the
county clerk in the county where the property was located,"' (2) the
personal representative mailed a letter to the county assessor paying current
taxes and advising the assessor that all tax notices were to be sent to
C.

100. Corlett II, 107 N.M. at 710, 763 P.2d at 1175 (emphasis added).
101. Id. (emphasis in Corlett I); see supra note 4.
102. Corlett II, 107 N.M. at 710, 763 P.2d at 1175.
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. Id. The court also noted that the insurance company is not an indispensable party to the
claim because "[a] determination of whether potential coverage exists can be made in the absence
of the insurance company .... [lit is clear that the claim has been made in order to establish
liability rather than to collect against the estate." Id.
105. 107 N.M. 362, 366, 758 P.2d 312, 316 (Ct. App. 1988).
106. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
107. N.M. CONST. art. II., § 18.
108. Fulton, 107 N.M. at 366, 758 P.2d at 316. The opinion was filed on June 28, 1988, two
months after Tulsa and one month before Corlett. The court looked strictly to the Mennonite
decision for its authority.
109. Id. at 367, 758 P.2d at 317.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 363, 758 P.2d at 313. The personal representative was from Texas and filed his proof
of appointment pursuant to N.M. STAT. AiNN. § 45-4-204 (1978).
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him," 2 and (3) the Division issued an estate tax certificate showing that
the taxes were paid on the property."'
III.

UNDUE INFLUENCE

In In re the Estate of Gonzales," 4 the court of appeals looked at the
issue of undue influence and the burden of proof for proving undue
influence." 5 In Gonzales, the decedent executed her will and some deeds
to her property at the same time. 1 6 Her grandson, who was one of three
witnesses to the will, was given some of the property under the will and
Was appointed personal representative of the estate." 7 The district court
set aside the will and the deeds stating that "[w]ithout specifically finding
that undue influence did exist, such evidence of it exists that undue
influence is presumed" and "[the grandson] has failed to rebut that
presumption, and he had the burden of so doing."" 8 The grandson
appealed claiming that "the trial court erred in considering the issue of
whether a presumption arose" and that there was no evidence to support
the findirig of presumed undue influence." 9
Under the Probate Code, which sets out the burdens of proof in formal
testacy proceedings and contested cases, the grandson had the burden of
proving a prima facie case of proper execution and the contestant had
the burden of proving a prima facie case of undue influence. 120 The
court found that the contestant could prove her prima facie showing of
undue influence under the New Mexico statutes by relying on a presumption of undue influence.' 2' Once the contestant satisfied her burden
by establishing facts sufficient to support a presumption of undue influence, the proponent has the burden of going forward with evidence
22
to meet that presumption.
However, the court reversed the trial court's finding that there was
evidence sufficient to constitute a presumption of undue influence.' 23 The
court began its analysis by stating that section 45-3-407 was merely a
restatement and clarification of the common law and added no substantive
changes to the common law, thereby allowing the court to review pre24
Code case law to determine undue influence.
The contestant may raise a presumption of undue influence through
evidence showing suspicious circumstances and a confidential relationship

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Fulton, 107 N.M. at 364, 758 P.2d at 314.
Id. at 367, 758 P.2d at 317.
108 N.M. 583, 775 P.2d 1300 (Ct. App. 1988).
Id. at 584-87, 775 P.2d at 1301-04.
Id.at 584, 775 P.2d at 1301.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-3-409 (1978 and Cum. Supp. 1988)).
Id. at 585, 775 P.2d at 1302 (citing Sup. CT. RuLEs ANN. 11-301 (Recomp. 1986)).
Id.
Id.
Id.

WILLS AND TRUSTS

Spring 1990]

between the testator and the beneficiary. 25 Relying primarily on two
earlier cases,' 26 the court stated that "suspicious circumstances include
(1) an elderly testator in a weakened physical or mental condition; (2)
lack of consideration for the bequest; (3) a disposition that is unnatural
or unjust; (4) the beneficiary's participation in procuring the will; and
(5) domination of the testator by the beneficiary."' 27 A confidential
relationship is not enough to presume undue influence.' 28 The only way
that age, poor health, or the inability to read can affect undue influence
is if these factors affect the testator's mental capacity.' 29 Under the facts
of this case,' 30 none of these factors affected the testator's mental capacity.' Also, although the grandson was a witness to the will, the court
found that he did not participate in procuring the will because two
32
witnesses are all that are needed, and the grandson was the third witness.
The court held that none of the individual circumstances raised a presumption of undue influence, and the presumption did not occur when
all the findings were considered as a whole.'"
IV.

GIFTS

Sandoval,'3 4

the decedent gave her grandson a warranty
In Vigil v.
deed.' The deed was to take effect when the decedent died. 3 6 If the
decedent survived the grandson, the deed was to become void.' 37 The
trial court decided that the deed was a present transfer of a present
interest when the deed was delivered to the grandson, but that possession
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that a present
was postponed.'
transfer of a present interest is not an attempted testamentary disposition
merely because enjoyment is postponed. 3 9 The court stressed that the
delivered deed, unlike a will, is irrevocable. ' 4 The delivered deed gave
the grandson a present interest, and therefore took effect before death,
with only enjoyment of the present interest postponed.' 4 ' The court stated
that it would look at the express, not implied, intention of the grantor
in view of the surrounding circumstances, and construe the deed in such

125. Id.
126. Galvan v. Miller, 79 N.M. 540, 445 P.2d 961 (1968); In re Will of Ferrill, 97 N.M. 383,
640 P.2d 489 (Ct. App. 1981).
127. Gonzales, 108 N.M. at 585, 775 P.2d at 1302.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 586, 775 P.2d at 1303.
130. The trial court found that the testator was mentally alert. Id. Also, although the testator
could not speak English, the will execution was performed entirely in Spanish. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-502(A) (1978)).
133. Id.
134. 106 N.M. 233, 741 P.2d 836 (Ct. App. 1987).
135. Id. at 234, 741 P.2d at 837.
136. Id. at 234-35, 741 P.2d at 837-38.
137. Id. at 235, 741 P.2d at 838.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing Callaghan v. Reed, 44 Or. App. 489, 605 P.2d 1382 (1980)).
140. Id.
141. Id.
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a way as to uphold its validity if possible. 42 The court then stated that
the deed's language and the surrounding circumstances 43 were sufficient
evidence of the decedent's intent to transfer a presently transferrable
interest. '
V.

CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS

In In re Estate of Bowles, 1 5 the parties agreed that the decedent's will
was unambiguous.'4 The courts, however, were called upon to construe
a will which gave the decedent's sister "one-half of any income, rents
or profits from any real property ... located in Bull Creek (Valle del
Toro) or Colinias, New Mexico" and a residuary clause in which the
testator left his children, if his wife predeceased him, "[M]y interest in
any real property owned by me at the time of my death, which I inherited
from my family, located in Bull Creek and/or Colinias, San Miguel
County[.]' ' 47 The plaintiffs claimed that the first devise gave the sister
one-half of the property in fee simple. 4 The court of appeals disagreed
with this construction stating that "[i]f a gift of income is followed by
a gift over of the corpus of the property, such gift over shows that the
gift of income was not intended to pass the entire property."' 49 Following
this rule, the court held that the sister's gift was a life estate." 0 The
court further noted that "[ilt would be unreasonable to infer that the
testator intended [the sister] and her heirs to continue to receive onehalf of the income from the property in perpetuity. Such an arrangement
could readily lead to serious complications in future management of the
property.""''
VI.

EVIDENCE

The court of appeals also ruled on evidence concerning the proof of
oral promises to pay vacation pay to employees of the decedent in In
re Estate of Bergman.5 2 In Bergman, the claimants were private nurses
for the decedent and her sister.' The nurses claimed that one of the
sisters promised them two weeks of paid vacation each year, with payment

142. Id.
143. The circumstances included evidence that the deed was drafted by a notary public, who
stated that the decedent had wanted to give the grandson the house while giving herself some
security, that the grandson had lived with the decedent for 13 years, and that the decedent had
told the grandson and others that the property was his. Id. at 236, 741 P.2d at 839.
144. Id.
145. 107 N.M. 739, 764 P.2d 510 (Ct. App. 1988).
146. Id. at 740, 764 P.2d at 511.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 741, 764 P.2d at 512 (quoting 4 W. BowE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF

WaLs § 33.21 (1961)).
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id.
107 N.M. 574, 761 P.2d 452 (Ct. App. 1988).
Id. at 575, 761 P.2d at 453.
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coming after the decedent sold her ranch in Minnesota.' 54 Although each
claimant alleged that the vacation pay agreement was in writing, neither
claimant submitted a bill for the overtime or had written evidence of
the agreement, claiming that they could not find the agreement.' 55
The court found that the statute of frauds was inapplicable to this
case, making a writing unnecessary to make a valid claim. 15 6 At trial,
the claimants presented evidence about their conversations with the decedent concerning the agreement. 5 7 The court held that this evidence was
admissible.'58 The court stated that the claimants' evidence may not have
been admissible under the old Dead Man's Statutes, which state that a
claimant cannot introduce evidence concerning matters which occurred
before the decedent's death, unless the evidence is corroborated. 5 9 Because
those statutes have been repealed, the court looked at whether the statements were hearsay.Ilw The court stated that the claimants' testimony
about the sister's statements concerning the vacation pay were not hearsay
61
because they were not used to prove the truth of the matter asserted.'
Instead, they were used "to prove that [the sister] had accepted an offer
made by the claimants," and were therefore not offered as testimony
"but rather of verbal conduct to which the law attaches duties and
liabilities. "1 62 Also, the statements were admissible as evidence of a promise
upon which the claimants reasonably relied. 163 The court added that
"[w]hen an extrajudicial statement aids in proving knowledge, belief,
good faith, reasonableness, or motive, it is admitted as circumstantial
evidence thereof."' l The court dismissed the claim that the claimants
cannot give oral evidence of a document by noting that the claimants
could produce proof of lost documents. 165
VII.

DAMAGES AGAINST THE ESTATE

In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Maidment,16 a
case of first impression, the court of appeals held that a deceased

154. Id. at 576, 761 P.2d at 454.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 576-77, 761 P.2d at 454-55. The court stated that full performance of a contract not
to be performed in one year renders the contract enforceable by the party who has performed. Id.
157. See id. at 576, 761 P.2d at 455.
158. Id. at 576-77, 761 P.2d at 455-56.
159. Id. at 577, 761 P.2d at 455.
160. Id. Under New Mexico's Rules of Evidence, "'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted." SuP. CT. RuLEs ANN. 11-801(C) (1986).
161. Bergman, 107 N.M. at 577-78, 761 P.2d at 455-56. See also Sup. CT. RuES ANN. 11-801
& 802 (1986).
162. Bergman, 107 N.M. at 578, 761 P.2d at 456. Because these assertions are not testimonial
but are made for another purpose, they are admissible. See id. at 578, 761 P.2d at 456 (citing E.
CLEARY, MCCORMCK ON EVIDENCE § 249 (3d ed. 1984)).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. SUP. CT. RULEs ANN. 11-1004 (1986) states, in part, that "other evidence of the contents
of a writing ... is admissible if ... [aIll originals are lost ... unless the proponent lost ...
them in bad faith."
166. 107 N.M. 568, 761 P.2d 446 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 413, 759 P.2d 200 (1988).
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tortfeasor's estate cannot be held liable for punitive damages.6 7 The court
followed the reasoning of the Florida Supreme Court to hold that "the
decedent's innocent heirs should not be punished when the wrongdoer
is unavailable because of death."'' 68 The court noted that allowing punitive
damages against a tortfeasor's estate would serve neither of the purposes
to punish the wrongdoer and
for assessing punitive damages which are
1 69
torts.
committing
from
others
to deter
VIII.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE

In In re Estate of Lopez,170 the decedent left a house as his only
substantial asset.' 7 ' His wife was his personal representative. 7 2 The trial
court awarded the decedent's wife a 41.08% interest in the property
17
($9,294.93) and the decedent's daughter a 58.92% interest ($13,331.47).
Later, the decedent's daughter petitioned the court to force the wife to
sell her interest to the daughter. 74 The wife filed a countermotion asking
the court to approve her plan of distribution, which called for a cash
payment to the daughter, in order to buy out the daughter's interest. 75
The court denied the daughter's motion and granted the wife's. 76 The
wife then sent the daughter a check for her share of the interest, and
stated that the daughter "had received 'assets from the net estate' of
$13,331.47" on the schedule of distribution. 77 The daughter refused the
check and appealed the trial court's decision, claiming, among other
things, that the wife was improperly allowed to continue as personal78
representative and that the daughter was entitled to distribution in kind.
The court of appeals summarily disposed of the personal representative
issue by stating that the wife did not have to be reappointed if she was
retained after a petition for formal appointment. 79 The court then noted
that the real property was the estate's only asset. 80 Therefore, the estate
could not give the daughter cash and could not allot the property to the
wife "because there would be nothing left to allot to [the daughter].
The trial court in effect required [the daughter] to sell her share to [the
wife]. By approving the 'distribution' of the estate, the trial court also

167. Id. at 571, 761 P.2d at 449.
168. Id. (citing Lohr v. Byrd, 552 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1988)).
169. Id. at 571, 761 P.2d at 449 (citing Lohr, 522 So. 2d at 846). The Florida court stated that
the deterrent effect is not furthered by "unjustly [inflicting punishment] upon the innocent, through
" Id.
a doctrine analogous to attainder ..
170. 106 N.M. 157, 740 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1987).
171. Id. at 158, 740 P.2d at 708.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 158, 740 P.2d at 708.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.at 158-59, 740 P.2d at 708-09.
179. Id.at 159, 740 P.2d at 709.
180. Id.
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ordered the sale [the wife] requested. This was error." 18' The court held

that the only authority the court had was to order a partition of the
property, not to force one heir to sell her part of the property to the
other. Is2 Therefore, the parties could either keep their undivided interests
as tenants-in-common, or the property would have to be sold.8 3
The court also noted that the record indicated that the daughter had
in fact filed a petition for partition as a separate action while the probate
case was pending. I1' The court found that the partition proceeding should
have been consolidated with the probate proceeding. 8 '
IX.

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE FEES

During the survey period, the court of appeals decided two cases which

in turn limited and expanded trial courts' powers to award personal

representative fees. In In re Estate of Corwin,'8 6 the court held that
United States Treasury notes, like United States Government bonds, are
the equivalent of cash under the statute regulating personal representative
compensation.8 7 The court found that the word "including" following

the word "cash" in the statute was meant to demonstrate types of cash

rather than limit what is considered cash. 188 Because cash is subject to
the
the lower personal representative fee schedule under the statute,
89
proceeds from the Treasury notes were subject to that rate.1

181. Id. at 159-60, 740 P.2d at 709-10.
182. Id. The court relied on the provisions of N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-3-911 (1978). Section 453-911 states that:
A. When two or more heirs or devisees are entitled to distribution of undivided
interests in any real or personal property of the estate, the personal representative
or one or more of the heirs or devisees may petition the district court prior to
the formal or informal closing of the estate, to make partition.
B. After notice to the interested heirs or devisees, the district court shall partition
the property.
C. The district court may direct the personal representative to sell any property
which cannot be partitioned without prejudice to the interested heirs and devisees
and which cannot conveniently be allotted to any one party.
The court also relied on In re Estate of Kunzler, 108 Idaho 374, 699 P.2d 1388 (1985).
183. Lopez, 106 N.M. at 160, 740 P.2d at 710.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. 106 N.M. 316, 742 P.2d 528 (Ct. App. 1987).
187. Id. at 318, 742 P.2d 530 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-3-719 (1978)). Section 45-3-719 states
that:
Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a personal representative shall be entitled
to a compensation of not more than ten percent on the first three thousand dollars
($3,000) and of not more than five percent on all amounts in excess of the first
three thousand dollars ($3,000) upon property at its estimated value which shall
come into his possession in his capacity as personal representative. However, if the
property consists of the proceeds of life insurance policies, or cash, including checking
accounts, time deposits, certificates of deposit, savings accounts, postal savings
certificates and all United States government bonds, then the personal representative's
compensation shall not exceed five percent of the first five thousand dollars ($5,000)
and not exceed one percent on all amounts in excess of the first five thousand
dollars ($5,000) ....
188. Corwin, 106 N.M. at 317, 742 P.2d at 529.
189. Id.
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In In re Estate of Greig,' g° the court held that a personal representative
may recover fees above those allowed by section 45-3-719 of the Probate
Code, but that the assets of a trust were not an estate asset which could
be used to determine the fee.' 9' In Greig, the estate's personal represen tative spent 98.5 hours on legal work for the estate and 93.5 hours
performing general personal representative duties. 192 His attorneys spent
130 hours working for the estate and also asked to be reimbursed for
the cost of hiring a law clerk to do research for the estate. 93 Part of
the personal representative's work was obtaining a judgment which ordered
a third party to convey estate assets to the personal representative.' 9 4 The
trial court held that assets of a trust created by the decedent could be
used to pay reasonable estate administration expenses "to the extent that
the assets of the estate . . . are insufficient."' 95
The trial court found that under the personal representative fee formula
set out in section 45-3-719,'9 the personal representative was entitled to
$302 . 97 The court relied on an expert's testimony that In re Keel's Estate9s
controlled the case, giving the trial court no discretion in setting administrator's fees.199
The court of appeals reversed, explaining that the legislature's 1976
amendment to section 45-3-719200 gave trial courts discretion in awarding
personal representative fees. 20 ' Because the court feared that the trial
court believed it was limited in awarding the fees, the court of appeals
remanded the case "so that the court may consider whether the facts
and circumstances surrounding this case warrant a fee award above that
provided by the formula. ' 20 2 The court of appeals limited its holding in
view of In re Estate of Corwin,20 3 stating that trial courts do not have
discretion to increase personal representative fees for property comprising
life insurance and the various forms of cash, as described in section 453-719.204 The court further stated that, on remand, the personal representative must show that he is entitled to the extra compensation by

190. 107 N.M. 227, 755 P.2d 71 (Ct. App. 1988).
191. Id. at 228, 755 P.2d at 72. For the provisions of § 45-3-719, see supra note 187.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 230, 755 P.2d at 74.
195. Id.
196. For the provisions of § 45-3-719, see supra note 187.
197. Greig, 107 N.M. at 228, 755 P.2d at 72. Although the court of appeals reversed the district
court on other grounds, it noted that even under the statutory scheme, the district court's computation
was erroneous. Id. at 229, 755 P.2d at 73. According to the district court's findings, the estate
was valued at $15,000, "through the combined efforts of [the personal representative] and the estate
attorneys." Id. at 228, 755 P.2d at 72. Under the compensation statute, the proper fee based upon
a $15,000 value would be more than $302. Id. at 229, 755 P.2d at 73.
198. 37 N.M. 569, 25 P.2d 806 (1933).
199. Greig, 107 N.M. at 228, 755 P.2d at 72.
200. The legislature added, among other things, the "[u]nless otherwise ordered by the court"
language. See supra note 187.
201. 107 N.M. at 229, 755 P.2d at 73.
202. Id. at 229, 755 P.2d at 73.
203. See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
204. Id. at 229, 755 P.2d at 73.
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showing that the work for that extra compensation was "not usual to
an ordinary estate administration, and further he must show the reasonable
' 20 5
value of his services to the estate, considering the value of the estate.
The court also held that a personal representative who does legal work
as part of her personal representative duties may collect attorneys' fees
for that work. 2° According to the court, the 1976 amendment also grants
the personal representative compensation outside of section 45-3-719,
including attorneys' fees under section 45-3-720.2°7 According to the court,
the personal representative carries the same burdens of proof in her
capacity as an attorney as she does in her capacity as a personal representative. 20s
The court of appeals further held that when the trial court determines
the personal representative fee, it may not consider the value of trust
assets which are available for an estate's reasonable expenses. 2°9 However,
the court implied that if the trust assets had "come into" the personal
representative's possession, presumably by an order stating that the trust
was a part of the estate going to the personal 210representative, the trust
assets would be included in the fee calculation.
X. TRUSTS
Granado,21 '

In Granado v.
the decedent was the beneficial owner of
a bar. 212 The decedent paid for the property, made all purchase installments, paid for taxes, insurance, and repairs, and controlled the business
and its assets. 213 After the decedent died, his attorney told family members
21 4
that the decedent's family had the beneficial interest in the property.
The decedent's brother, who was named personal representative, promised
the decedent's son that the brother would give the son the bar and
property when the son was twenty-one years old, but did not list the
property as an estate asset in the probate proceedings. 21 5 When the son
turned twenty-one, he first learned that his uncle and sister contended
that the decedent's heirs did not own the bar. 21 6 The decedent's sister,
who had run the bar for eight years, also had the decedent's father

205. Id.
206. Id. at 229-30, 755 P.2d at 73-74 (citing In re Estate of Brown, 653 P.2d 928 (Okla. 1982);
In re Estate of Hackett, 51 Ill.
App. 3d 474, 9 Il1. Dec. 592, 366 N.E.2d 1103 (1977); and 31 Am.
JUR. 2d Executors and Administrators § 500 (1967)).
207. Id. at 230, 755 P.2d at 74.
208. Id.
209. Id.; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-3-719 (1978). For the text of section 45-3-719, see supra note
187.
210. Greig, 107 N.M. at 230, 755 P.2d at 74.
211. 107 N.M. 456, 760 P.2d 148 (1988).
212. Id. at 458, 760 P.2d at 150. Because New Mexico prohibits convicted felons from holding
liquor licenses, the decedent, who was a convicted felon, had all leases and purchase contracts made
in the name of his wife, and later, his father. Id. at 457-58, 760 P.2d at 149-50.
213. Id. at 459, 760 P.2d at 151.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 458, 760 P.2d at 150.
216. Id.
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transfer the property to her as a gift, despite the fact that the estate
attorney told her that the father held the property in trust for the
decedent's heirs.2 7 The
son sued for the property and won; the brother
28
and sister appealed.
In affirming, the supreme court began by stating that the son's claim
was within the statute of limitations because "the statute of limitations
does not run between a trustee and a beneficiary until there has been
a repudiation of the trust, whether it be a constructive trust, or a resulting
trust. ' 21 9 The court then held that the trial court was correct in calling
the arrangement a resulting trust because the son "demonstrate[d] that
. . . his predecessor [had] furnished the money for acquisition of property
with the intent that the one who [took] title [would] hold it in trust for
the one who advanced the purchase money and that the money was so

applied. "220
The court concluded by stating that the doctrine of unclean hands did
not apply to this case. 22' The court weighed "the policy of denying relief
to one who transfers property for a wrongful purpose, against the policy
disfavoring unjust enrichment of a transferee who was not intended to
hold beneficial interest in the property. ' ' 222 Although the doctrine of
unclean hands may have barred an action by the decedent, the supreme
court quoted the trial court with approval that "the State had 'little to
gain in achieving its public purpose of protecting the morals of every
community in the
state by here penalizing the unoffending children of
'

[the decedent].

"223
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217. Id.
218. Id. at 457,
219. Id. at 458,
occur until the son
at 151.
220. Id. at 459,
221. Id. at 460,
222. Id. at 460,
516 (1984)).
223. Id.

760 P.2d at 149.
760 P.2d at 150 (citations omitted). The court held that repudiation did not
was told that he did not have an interest in the property. Id. at 459, 760 P.2d
760 P.2d at 151.
760 P.2d at 152.
760 P.2d at 152 (citing Garcia v. Marquez, 101 N.M. 427, 430, 684 P.2d 513,

